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I. INTRODUCTION
The mens real requirement has long been a crucial component
to American criminal law for determining the guilt of an accused
in criminal prosecutions. 2 Along with establishing the accused's
actus reus,3 prosecutors generally have the burden of proving the
requisite mens rea, or criminal intent, in order to secure a convic-
1. Mens rea, or "guilty mind," refers to "(tihe state of mind that the prosecution, to
secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009).
2. Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in
the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 682.
3. Actus reus, or "guilty act," refers to "[t]he wrongful deed that comprises the physi-
cal components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish
criminal liability." Id. at 41.
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tion.4 While this general principle of American jurisprudence has
rarely, if ever, been disputed, interpretation of certain statutes'
particular mens rea requirements has spawned much debate
within the legal community. 5 Particularly at issue is whether cer-
tain statutes' mens rea requirements mandate a showing of sub-
jective intent on the part of the accused or a more lenient showing
of an objective mindset that would be possessed by a reasonable
person under like circumstances. 6 In light of society's growing
drug problems, section 841(c)(2) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
and Prevention and Control Act 7 has been thrust to the forefront
of the mens rea statutory interpretation debate among the various
circuits.
Section 841(c)(2) makes it a crime for a person to knowingly or
intentionally possess or distribute a listed chemical "knowing, or
having reasonable cause to believe, that the listed chemical will be
used to manufacture a controlled substance."18 Given the stark
rise in methamphetamine production and use in this country over
the last decade, 9 violations under section 841(c)(2) have most re-
cently taken the form of individuals distributing unusually large
amounts pseudoephedrine, a common decongestant and critical
ingredient in the manufacturing and production of metham-
phetamine. 10 As pseudoephedrine is a legally obtainable decon-
gestant sold in many pharmacies nationwide, law enforcement has
been faced with the difficult task of regulating the distribution of a
legal substance in an effort to suppress the manufacturing of the
illegal and highly dangerous methamphetamine."1 In response to
this growing problem, several new regulations have been enacted
to control the sale of common, readily obtainable methampheta-
4. Most statutory mens rea requirements demand a showing of subjective intent on
the part of the accused in committing the alleged crime; however, a smaller number of
statutes, namely those relating to strict liability crimes, merely require a showing of objec-
tive intent, based on the reasonable person standard. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CREMNAL LAW § 5.1(a) (2d ed. 2003).
5. See Note, Mens Rea in Federal Criminal Law, Ill HARV. L. REV. 2402 (1998).
6. See U.S. v. Khattub, 536 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2008).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (2006).
8. Id. (emphasis added).
9. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Methamphetamine,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/concern/meth.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
10. See, e.g., Khattub, 536 F.3d 765; United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir.
2005); United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kaur, 382
F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2000).
11. Methamphetamine, supra note 9.
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mine ingredients, such as the pseudoephedrine.12 As a result, it
has become increasingly difficult to purchase or distribute large
amounts of pseudoephedrine, since federal law' 3 made it illegal to
possess or distribute the legal substance with the knowledge, or
with a reasonable cause to believe, that the distributed pseu-
doephedrine will be used to manufacture methamphetamine.' 4 In
the midst of America's war against methamphetamine, circuit
courts are left with one lingering question: What is the correct
interpretation of the "knowing, or having reasonable cause to be-
lieve"' 5 mens rea requirement found in section 841(c)(2)?
As it currently stands, there is a split in the circuits as to the in-
terpretation of the mens rea requirement found in section
841(c)(2).16 With only four circuits weighing in on the issue,17 the
minority has taken the stance that the statute requires a defen-
dant's subjective knowledge that the drugs he or she distributes
will be used to manufacture a controlled substance,' 8 while the
majority holds that the statute requires either subjective knowl-
edge or an objective cause to believe to convict.' 9
Recognizing the serious nature of a felony drug conviction, the
minority holds that the "reasonable cause to believe" standard is
akin to subjective, actual knowledge of the individual, 20 thus en-
suring that the defendant truly has the requisite criminal intent
before subjecting the defendant to criminal conviction. The major-
ity, on the other hand, takes the position that "reasonable cause to
believe" equates to having knowledge of certain facts that, while
not amounting to direct knowledge, would cause a reasonable per-
son under similar circumstances and with knowledge of the same
12. See, e.g., Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
237, 110 Stat. 3099 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19, 21, 28, 42 U.S.C.);
Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 21, 42 U.S.C.).
13. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.02 (2009).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Khattub, 536 F.3d at 769; Tnsong, 425 F.3d at 1289; Galvan, 407 F.3d at
958; Kaur, 382 F.3d at 1157-58; Prat her, 205 F.3d at 1269.
17. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the cir-
cuit split in Khattub, but declined to "weigh in" on the debate regarding the proper mens
rea interpretation. Khattub, 536 F.3d at 769. The court held that there was sufficient
evidence proving the defendant's actual knowledge that the pseudoephedrine he purchased
would be used to manufacture methamphetamine; thus, an interpretation of the statute's
mens rea requirement was not necessary. Id.
18. See United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1269 (10th Cir. 2000); Truong, 425 F.3d
at 1282.
19. See Gal van, 407 F.3d at 957; Kaur, 382 F.3d at 1157; Prat her, 205 F.3d at 1270-72.
20. Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1269.
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facts to conclude that the drug he or she distributes would likely
be used to manufacture a controlled substance.2' This holding
closely resembles a negligence state of mind as opposed to any sort
of criminal intent. Such an approach serves to alleviate the prose-
cution's burden of proof, while simultaneously placing an unneces-
sary risk of conviction on individuals who distribute legal drugs
without any actual intent or knowledge that they will be used to
manufacture illegal substances. As such, the majority's interpre-
tation of the section 841(c)(2)'s mens rea requirement is inappro-
priate as it undermines the very purpose of the mens rea require-
ment, which is to convict those individuals who are not only guilty
of misconduct but who also intended to commit those very acts of
misconduct.
This comment will concentrate on the serious flaws associated
with the majority's interpretation of the mens rea requirement
found in section 841(c)(2), while exploring the appropriateness of
the minority interpretation. The following section will discuss the
major circuit court cases and the split, noting each circuit's ra-
tionale for its respective interpretation of the mens rea require-
ment found in section 841(c)(2). Section III will provide a detailed
analysis explaining the appropriateness of the minority interpre-
tation, and point out the numerous legal, ethical, and constitu-
tional flaws associated with the majority interpretation. It will
also discredit the majority's criticisms of the minority approach by
evaluating the minority's interpretation in conjunction with the
very purpose behind a statutory mens rea requirement. Finally,
Section IV will summarize both the main arguments in favor of
the minority's interpretation and the arguments detailing the ab-
surdity of the majority's interpretation. The comment will close
with a recommendation that all other circuits that have yet to ad-
dress this issue adopt the minority's interpretation of section
841(c)(2)'s mens rea requirement.
II. BRIEF HISTORY: INTERPRETATION OF MENS REA IN 21 U.S. C. §
841(C)(2)
A. The Rise of the Majority Interpretation: Either Subjective In-
tent or an Objective Cause to Believe
As noted, the rise in methamphetamine manufacturing resulted
in numerous regulations and other tactics to control the distribu-
21. Kaur, 382 F.3d at 1157-58.
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tion of many legal drugs, such as pseudoephedrine, which are
common ingredients in methamphetamine. 22 As pseudoephedrine
can be legally purchased and sold in this country, law enforcement
and the courts alike are faced with a slippery slope when trying to
determine whether a distributer of the legal drug is in violation of
section 841(c)(2); namely, whether the distributor possesses the
requisite "knowledge, or reasonable cause to believe"23 that the
legal drug will be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Be-
cause there is no presumption that a person who distributes large
quantities of pseudoephedrine has the knowledge that it will be
used to manufacture methamphetamine, prosecutors must bring
forth additional evidence to satisfy the knowledge requirement.
24
As it currently stands, the circuit split is predicated on the degree
of evidence that prosecutors must set forth in order to prove the
accused had knowledge, or a reasonable cause to believe. 25
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
was the first to address this statutory interpretation issue in the
context of pseudoephedrine and methamphetamine. 26 In United
States v. Prather, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's
conviction of Vernon Prather, Jr., the operator of a mail-order
company that distributed large quantities of pseudoephedrmne to
various wholesalers as well as individual purchasers.27 Prather
appealed the district court's ruling, claiming that the court erred
in its instructions to the jury regarding the phrase "reasonable
cause to believe" as found in section 841(d)(2). 28 The jury was in-
structed that to determine whether one had a "reasonable cause to
believe," they should ask whether the facts presented in this case
"would cause a reasonable person knowing those facts to reasona-
bly conclude that the pseudoephedrmne was being delivered to the
illegal manufacturer of a controlled substance." 29 Prather argued
that the instructions were faulty as they made no mention of any
bad faith requirement, and reduced the "reasonable cause to be-
lieve" standard to a mere negligence standard. 30 Unfortunately
22. Methamphetamine, supra note 9.
23. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).
24. Khattub, 536 F.3d at 769.
25. Id.
26. Prat her, 205 F.3d 1265.
27. Id. at 1272. The lower court found the defendant to be in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(d)(2), which is now 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). Id. at 1268.
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for Prather, he failed to object to the jury instructions at trial,
forcing the Eleventh Circuit to review the issue based on a plain
error standard.31 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the conviction, not-
ing that there was a substantial amount of evidence proving that
Prather had actual knowledge that the drugs he distributed would
be used to manufacture a controlled substance. 32 As such, the
lower court's jury instructions as to "reasonable cause to believe"
did not merit a reversal based on plain error. 33
Four years after the decision in Prather, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's interpretation of "reasonable cause to believe" as found in
section 841(c)(2) in the case of United States v. Kaur.34 On appeal
to the Ninth Circuit, Kaur challenged the jury instructions given
by the lower court regarding the "reasonable cause to believe"
standard.35 Kaur took the position that "reasonable cause to be-
lieve" should be somewhat equated to actual knowledge, rather
than a reasonable person standard akin to negligence.36 The
Ninth Circuit readily rejected Kaur's position, claiming that the
language of section 841(c)(2) contains both "knowledge" and "rea-
sonable cause to believe," reflecting Congress's intent to utilize
both a subjective and objective standard as two distinct alterna-
tives.37 The court proclaimed that a standard which equated "rea-
sonable cause to believe" to "actual knowledge" would be superflu-
ous and redundant. 38
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit defended its interpretation of
the statute's mens rea requirement, claiming that its approach
does not replace a subjective standard with an objective reason-
31. Id. In order to obtain a reversal based on plain error, the instruction at issue must
be a plainly incorrect statement of the law and must have most likely attributed to an in-
correct verdict, causing substantial injustice. Id.
32. Id. Evidence was presented at trial showing Prather's knowledge that many of his
customers were being investigated for drug manufacturing, and also that Prather received
an opinion letter notifying him that his conduct placed him at risk for violation of 21 U.s.c.
§ 841(d)(2). Id. at 1268.
33. Prat her, 205 F.3d at 1271.
34. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155. The defendant, a convenience store owner, was charged with
distributing pseudoephedrine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) after selling large quanti-
ties of the drug to an undercover agent. Id. at 1156.
35. Id. at 1156. The district court's jury instructions stated that "[rleasonable cause to
believe' means to have knowledge of facts which, although not amounting to direct knowl-
edge, would cause a reasonable person knowing the same facts, to reasonably conclude that
the pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture a controlled substance." Id.
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able person standard akin to negligence. 39 The court's only ra-
tionale for this defense was that its interpretation simply elabo-
rates upon the statutory language of section 841(c)(2), incorporat-
ing both a subjective and objective standard.40
The following year, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit was presented with the very same statutory inter-
pretation issue in United States v. Galvan.41 On appeal to the
Eighth Circuit, Galvan argued that the district court erred in fail-
ing to instruct the jury that the phrase "reasonable cause to be-
lieve," as found in section 841(c)(2), required ... an inquiry into
what this particular defendant had reason to believe' and is a
standard 'akin to actual knowledge."' 42 In rejecting Galvan's ar-
gument, the Eighth Circuit relied on the Ninth Circuit's interpre-
tation of "reasonable cause to believe" in Kaur.43 The court reiter-
ated the Ninth Circuit's rationale, claiming that by equating "rea-
sonable cause to believe" with "actual knowledge," the mens rea
requirement of section 841(c)(2) would be redundant."4 As such,
the Eighth Circuit joined the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits in in-
terpreting the "reasonable cause to believe" standard in section
841(c)(2) to require either a subjective intent on the part of the
accused or an objective intent, rooted in the reasonable person
standard.
B. The Rise of the Minority Interpretation: Subjective Intent Only
The same year the Eleventh Circuit introduced what is now the
majority interpretation of section 841(c)(2)'s mens rea require-
ment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
offered its own interpretation of the statute in United States v.
Saffo.45 After being arrested for her part in a large-scale pseu-
doephedrine distribution operation that sold large quantities of
the drug to various wholesale operations, Randa Saffo was con-
39. Kaur, 382 F.3d at 1157.
40. Id.
41. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954. Defendant was arrested after police officers, conducting
surveillance, followed defendant while he traveled between numerous convenience stores,
each time leaving with large quantities of pseudoephedrine. Id. at 957.
42. Id. at 957. The defendant argued that "such an instruction was necessary to avoid
constitutional problems that would result from an objective mens rea requirement." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260.
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victed of seven counts under section 841(d)(2).46 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit examined the constitutionality of the statute's mens
rea requirement, noting that "the standard involves a subjective
inquiry that looks to whether the particular defendant accused of
the crime knew or had reasonable cause to believe the listed
chemical would be used to manufacture a controlled substance." 47
Furthermore, the court explained that such an interpretation "re-
quires scienter to be evaluated through the lens of this particular
defendant, rather than from the perspective of a hypothetical rea-
sonable man."4 8 The court eventually held that the "reasonable
cause to believe standard" is one akin to actual knowledge, as
guilt itself is a personal matter.49 To not base the mens rea re-
quirement on the personal, subjective knowledge of the individual
would undermine the very purpose of the mens rea.50
In 2005, the Tenth Circuit solidified its position in United States
v. Truong,5' holding once again that the "reasonable cause to be-
lieve" standard requires actual knowledge or something very close
to it.52 In overruling the trial court's conviction, the Tenth Circuit
noted that it was simply not enough for the prosecutors to show
that the defendant had knowledge that his customers were "up to
no good."5 3 According to the court, the mens rea requirement of
section 841(c)(2) is unusually specific and explicitly requires a
showing that the accused had actual knowledge, or something
very similar, that the drugs he or she sold would be used to manu-
facture a controlled substance.54 As the court noted in Saffo, this
narrow interpretation of the statute "imposes a constitutionally
sufficient mens rea requirement. 55
In Truong, the defendant was a convenience store owner who
faced conviction under section 841(c)(2) for distributing large
amounts of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine under circumstances
that suggested he had knowledge that they were used for purposes
46. Id. at 1266-67. The district court found the defendant to be in violation of 21 u.s.c.
§ 841(d)(2), which was later changed to 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). Id.
47. Id. at 1268.
48. Id. at 1268-69 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 1269.
50. Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1269.
51. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282.
52. Id. at 1289.
53. Id. (quoting Principal Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 13, Truong, 425 F.3d 1282
(No. 04-5094)).
54. Id. at 1289-90.
55. Saffo, 227 F.3d atl268.
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unrelated to their stated medical uses.56 The court adamantly
noted, however, that to obtain a conviction under section 841(c)(2):
It is not sufficient for the government to prove that the defen-
dant knew, intended, or had reasonable cause to believe it
that the substance would be abused or would be used illegally.
Nor is it sufficient for the government to prove that the de-
fendant was negligent or reckless with respect to the risk that
the ephedrine or pseudoephedrine he sold would be used to
manufacture methamphetamine. 57
The court asserted that the unusually specific mens rea re-
quirement found in section 841(c)(2) required a greater showing
from the prosecution, specifically a showing of definitive proof that
the defendant had actual knowledge, or a reasonable cause to be-
lieve, that the substance would be used for the specific purpose of
manufacturing methamphetamine. 58
Following the interpretive approach it had taken in Saffo, 59 the
Tenth Circuit again interpreted the mens rea requirement in sec-
tion 841(c)(2) as a standard akin to actual knowledge.60 In so do-
ing, the court strengthened its position by listing several means by
which the government can meet its burden of proving the defen-
dant had actual knowledge. Such means include setting forth evi-
dence that the defendant received an official warning or notifica-
tion about the drugs, using an undercover agent to converse with
the defendant regarding the legal substance sold and its connec-
tion with methamphetamine production, and using the defen-
dant's own actions and words that revealed his actual knowledge
that the drugs sold will be used to manufacture methampheta-
56. Tntong, 425 F.3d at 1284. As the court stated, "the government presented an abun-
dance of evidence from which a jury might reasonably infer that Mr. Truong knew that his
customers 'were up to no good."' Id. The evidence showed that Truong repeatedly sold
unusually large amounts of pseudoephedrine to customers either after store hours or when
no other customers were present in the store. Id. Those who purchased the large quanti-
ties from Truong did so in a secretive manner, arriving after store hours and concealing
their purchases in styrofoam cups. Id. Truong sold the pseudoephedrine in cash transac-
tions only, where the drugs were not rung up at the counter, and no records of the drug
sales were maintained in the store books. Id. at 1290. Further evidence showed that
Truong purchased the pseudoephedrine "outside of ordinary channels from an unknown
person, and sold them without the usual packaging and labeling." Truong, 425 F.3d at
1290.
57. Id. at 1289 (citing United States v. Green, 779 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (7th Cir.1985)).
58. Id.
59. 227 F.3d 1260.
60. Truong, 425 F.3d at 1289.
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mine.61 The court concluded that the prosecution presented no
such direct evidence in this case regarding the defendant's subjec-
tive, actual knowledge that the pseudoephedrine he sold would be
used to manufacture methamphetamine. 62 Although the govern-
ment presented ample evidence that the defendant knew the
drugs he sold would be used by his customers for some improper
purpose, such knowledge is not punishable under section
841(c)(2).63
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Interpretation May Produce Unconstitutional
Results
The majority interpretation of the mens rea requirement found
in section 841(c)(2) dangerously straddles the line between consti-
tutionality and unconstitutionality, as it has the potential of
criminalizing a broad range of apparently innocent actions. As
such, the majority interpretation carries with it a high probability
of several constitutional challenges, as it can be argued that the
majority's mens rea interpretation renders section 841(c)(2) un-
constitutionally overbroad on its face.
Generally, statutes succumb to overbreadth challenges when it
is proven that the statute, on its face, prohibits a substantial
amount of protected activity. 64 More significantly, statutes that
contain a mens rea requirement, such as section 841(c)(2), may be
deemed unconstitutionally overbroad if a presumption is attached
to the mens rea, such as presumptions of knowledge or intent on
behalf of the accused.65 Although no case law explicitly states that
there is a presumption that a person who distributes large quanti-
61. Id. at 1289-90.
62. Id. at 1290.
63. Id. at 1291. The court supported its claim, stating:
For all we know from the evidence presented to the jury in the government's case in
chief, Mr. Truong may have thought that ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are them-
selves subject to abuse or that his purchasers were addicted to over-the-counter medi-
cations. He could have thought that he and his customers were evading taxes, or
that the products were contraband for some reason beyond his ken. 'While such mo-
tives would hardly rebound to Mr. Truong's credit, they are not punishable by the
statutes under which he was convicted.
Id.
64. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
65. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding that the statute's mens rea
required intent to threaten or harass with respect to cross-burning; and the built-in pre-
sumption that all cross-burning is done with intent to threaten or harass rendered the
statute fatally overbroad).
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ties of pseudoephedrine has the knowledge that it will be used to
manufacture methamphetamine, the majority interpretation of
section 841(c)(2) essentially creates such a presumption in in-
stances where the prosecution cannot meet its burden of proving
subjective knowledge of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority has utilized a two-step approach in accomplishing
this. First, the majority has dispelled the long-standing notion
that mens rea requirements are intended to focus on the personal,
subjective guilty mind of the accused. Rather, the majority inter-
pretation promotes conviction based on an objective, "reasonable
person" mens rea interpretation that closely resembles a negli-
gence standard.
Second, the majority, in conjunction with its use of an objective
mens rea interpretation, creates the presumption that the "rea-
sonable person" would know that bulk quantities of pseudoephed-
rine would be used by the purchaser of the drug in the manufac-
turing of methamphetamine. As prior case law suggests, such a
presumption attached to the statute's mens rea alone could render
the majority's approach susceptible to constitutional challenges.66
Moreover, the problem with the majority approach is compounded
with a showing that the presumption described above is predi-
cated on several other presumptions regarding the ordinary, rea-
sonable man including, but not limited to, the following presump-
tions: the reasonable man knows what methamphetamine is,
knows the intricate details of its production, knows that pseu-
doephedrine is a common ingredient used to produce metham-
phetamine, and knows that large quantities of pseudoephedrine
are commonly purchased by individuals who seek to manufacture
and distribute methamphetamine. As if one presumption at-
tached to the mens rea interpretation does not open the door to
constitutional challenges in and of itself, the fact that the ultimate
presumption67 is prefaced on several other presumptions regard-
ing knowledge of the objective, reasonable person surely com-
pounds the constitutional problems associated with the majority
interpretation.
Most, if not all, of the presumptions detailed above are unwar-
ranted, as it is unreasonable to believe that the ordinary, reason-
able person is highly familiar with the many facets associated
66. See Black, 538 U.S. at 363-64.
67. The objective, reasonable person who sells or distributes large quantities of pseu-
doephedrine does so with the knowledge that the legal drugs will be used to manufacture
methamphetamine.
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with the production of methamphetamine. This is especially true
when considering that the stark rise in methamphetamine pro-
duction is a relatively recent phenomenon within our society.68
We would likely be going far out on a limb to suggest that even the
average adult American knows anything about the manufacturing
of methamphetamine. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged this point
in Truong, stating that the government would need to present
some degree of evidence that knowledge of the connection between
pseudoephedrine and methamphetamine production is sufficiently
widespread among individuals under similar circumstances as the
accused so that the defendant's knowledge can be inferred. 69 In
fact, Officer Deramus, the government's own witness in Truong,
testified that the relationship between the two drugs is not com-
mon knowledge among everyone. 70 Given this, any presumption
that says the ordinary, reasonable man has sufficient knowledge
of the detailed intricacies of methamphetamine production is sim-
ply ludicrous.
Furthermore, the majority interpretation, through the creation
and application of its reasonable person presumption, potentially
serves to criminalize a substantial amount of seemingly innocent
conduct. Despite increased governmental regulation regarding its
sale,7' pseudoephedrine remains a legally distributable and ob-
tainable drug. At its core, pseudoephedrine is an effective decon-
gestant and cold remedy that is still widely used for this legiti-
mate purpose. As such, courts walk a fine line when determining
the guilt of an accused under section 841(c)(2), as the distribution
of pseudoephedrine may very well have been done with a com-
pletely innocent mind on the behalf of the accused.
The majority's interpretation of section 841(c)(2) ignores this
possibility, applying a prosecution-friendly objective knowledge
standard that encourages conviction of an accused based simply
on what the hypothetical reasonable person should know, bla-
tantly disregarding what each particular defendant actually does
know. Thus, an accused within a majority jurisdiction can be sen-
68. Methamphetamine, supra note 9.
69. Truang, 425 F.3d at 1290. The government failed to present any such evidence. Id.
70. Id.
71. Pseudoephedrine, a common ingredient in the decongestant Sudafed, must be sold
in "blister packs" rather than in loose form. Also, pseudoephedrine must now be sold "be-
hind-the-counter" at retail stores and pharmacies, thus making it more difficult for pur-
chasers to obtain large quantities of the drug. Purchases are limited to no more than nine
grams per 30-day period, and purchasers must sign-in and provide identification before
making purchases. Methamphetamine, supra note 8.
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tenced to serve twenty years in prison72 for innocently or igno-
rantly selling a legal decongestant, simply by a court's opinion
that a hypothetical person would have known that the legal drugs
he sold would eventually be used illegally. Not only does this im-
pose an unreasonable risk of liability on pharmacies and conven-
ience stores alike, it runs afoul of the United States Constitution
through the grossly unjust results it produces.
The minority's use of a subjective standard, on the other hand,
ensures that no such injustice occurs. The minority only subjects
an accused to the severe felony punishments under section
841(c)(2) if the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that this particular defendant knew or, through the presentation
of sufficient circumstantial evidence, had reason to know that the
drugs he sold would be used by the purchaser to manufacture an
illegal substance. This interpretation does not necessarily serve
as a life preserver for any given defendant. Rather, it merely
holds the prosecution to its constitutional burden of proof through
the practice of due diligence,73 thus ensuring that justice is indeed
served. As the Tenth Circuit has suggested, there is generally a
significant amount of circumstantial evidence that the prosecution
can bring forth in any given case to prove the subjective knowl-
edge of the accused under section 841(c)(2). 74
B. The Minority Interpretation Reflects the Legislative Intent Be-
hind § 841(c) (2)
Compared to other criminal statutes, interpretation of the mens
rea requirement found in section 841(c)(2) is unusually significant
and important, primarily because several of the chief ingredients
that go into the production of methamphetamine may be sold,
purchased, and possessed legally in this country. 75 Thus, convict-
72. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(c).
73. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments "protectoj the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged").
74. See Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1263-67 (stating that circumstantial evidence of the defen-
dant's subjective knowledge included taking drastic steps to conceal her conduct, such as
using fake names to rent storage units, requesting that her name remain off of all invoices,
using fictitious company licenses, lying to the flEA about her pseudoephedrine customers
and her first-hand knowledge regarding a DEA "Red Notice," engaging almost exclusively
in cash transactions, and other evidence).
75. Common ingredients used in the manufacture of methamphetamine include pseu-
doephedrine, ephedrine, red phosphorus, rubbing alcohol, ether, paint thinner, iodine,
chloroform, benzene, and drain cleaner, among other substances. Citizens Against Meth,
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ing defendants under this statute represents a delicate situation,
as a defendant's seemingly questionable conduct may have in fact
been the product of an innocent state of mind, and vice versa.
Understanding this, the Tenth Circuit appropriately recognized
the unusually specific nature of section 841(c)(2)'s mens rea re-
quirement as intended by Congress. 76 By requiring the prosecu-
tion to prove a defendant's actual knowledge, or something close to
it, the minority approach effectively ensures that innocent people
are not placed at an unreasonable risk of criminal liability. The
minority's interpretation therefore reflects the true purpose be-
hind mens rea requirements: convict individuals only for crimes
that they intended to commit with the requisite guilty state of
mind.77
Nevertheless, it is true that a given statute's particular mens
rea requirement can take the form of either a subjective, personal
guilt standard or an objective, reasonable person standard. 78
However, a closer examination of these respective mens rea forms
and their general applicability tends to illustrate the appropriate-
ness of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of section 841(c)(2).
A typical statute's mens rea requirement is generally reflected
through the use of precise statutory language, such as knowingly,
intentionally, willingly, negligently, carelessly, or recklessly. 79 A
mens rea that requires proof of subjective, personal guilt on the
part of the accused may include one or more of the first three
words, while a mens rea that requires only proof of objective guilt
may include either or all of the latter three.80 In instances where
a statutory mens rea contains words such as knowingly or inten-
tionally, the Supreme Court has held that the government must
always meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant acted with the requisite subjective and personal
guilty state of mind in order to secure a conviction.81 Therefore,
Methamphetamine Ingredients, http://www.citizensagainstmeth.org/methjingredients.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
76. See Truong, 425 F.3d at 1291.
77. Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARv. L. REV. 905, 919-20 (1939).
78. LaFave, supra note 3, § 5.1(c).
79. Id.
80. Id. With crimes involving recklessness, however, there is a degree of subjective
guilt involved, such that the defendant must realize in his own mind the risk which his
conduct creates. Id.
81. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (holding that in cases involving
subjective mens rea requirements the prosecution must prove defendant's personal guilty
mind; presumptions that defendant intended the outcome of his or her actions does not
meet this burden).
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criminal statutes containing words of subjective intent, such as
section 841(c)(2)'s use of "knowing," bestow upon the prosecution
the heavier burden of proving the accused's subjective guilty mind
beyond a reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, statutory mens rea requirements that per-
mit a more lenient showing of objective fault on the part of the
accused tend to lessen the prosecution's ultimate burden, as the
government in these cases need only prove that the defendant did
not meet the reasonable person standards associated with negli-
gence, recklessness, or carelessness. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that many statutes containing these objective mens rea re-
quirements serve to criminalize conduct that represent lesser of-
fenses, which carry less severe criminal penalties, than similar
crimes that require a showing of subjective intent.82 This general
rule becomes evident when comparing the criminal sanctions as-
sociated with the offense of negligent homicide (i.e., involuntary
manslaughter) with the criminal sanctions that are attached to
the offense of intentional homicide (i.e., murder in the first de-
gree).83 Those criminal offenses that require a mere showing of
objective fault tend to carry lesser criminal sanctions than those
offenses that require the prosecution to prove the subjective per-
sonal guilt of the accused.
Interestingly enough, this phenomenon can help prove the va-
lidity of the minority's interpretation of the mens rea requirement
found in section 841(c)(2). Under the statute, a defendant can be
convicted upon the prosecution's showing of either knowledge or a
reasonable cause to believe. 84 Regardless of whether the prosecu-
tion proves actual knowledge or a reasonable cause to believe on
the part of the accused, the criminal sanctions for each are exactly
the same: a prison term of up to twenty years.85 In light of the
above analysis, it can be said that the statute's inclusion of the
word "knowing," coupled with Congress's failure to include lesser
criminal sanctions for convictions based on a defendant's "reason-
able cause to believe," indicates Congress's intent to limit the
reach of section 841(c)(2) to pseudoephedrine distributors who
have the actual knowledge, or something akin to actual knowl-
edge, that the drugs sold would be used to manufacture metham-
phetamine. As such, it can also be said that the Tenth Circuit's
82. LaFave, supra note 3, at § 5.4(g).
83. Id.
84. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).
85. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c).
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interpretation of section 841(c)(2)'s mens rea requirement cor-
rectly reflects congressional intent.
C. The Majority Interpretation Undermines the Purpose of the
Mens Rea Requirement
As noted earlier, the historical purpose behind the mens rea re-
quirement has traditionally been to criminalize certain acts of
misconduct that the defendant committed with a subjective, guilty
mind.86 The majority approach, on the other hand, carries the po-
tential to do just the opposite, that is criminalize seemingly inno-
cent acts of pseudoephedrine distribution regardless of the defen-
dant's true personal knowledge regarding methamphetamine pro-
duction. The mere potential for such unjust and absurd results
demonstrates the serious ethical flaws associated with the major-
ity's interpretation. Moreover, the very fact that majority's inter-
pretation incorporates the thoughts of another "reasonable per-
son" undermines the traditional purpose of the mens rea to punish
acts of misconduct that an individual knowingly or intentionally
committed on his or her own volition.
Furthermore, it is important to note once again that a defen-
dant who is convicted under section 841(c)(2) is subjected to the
same felony punishment regardless of whether the conviction is
based on direct knowledge or a reasonable cause to believe.87 This
proves to be a significant factor once again in comparing the ap-
propriateness of the minority interpretation versus the majority
interpretation. In Staples v. United States,88 the Supreme Court
noted that the harshness of a penalty imposed by any given stat-
ute has traditionally been a significant consideration in determin-
ing Congress's true intent regarding that statute's mens rea re-
quirement.89 The Court furthered its position, stating:
[W] here . . dispensing with mens rea would require the de-
fendant to have knowledge only of traditionally lawful con-
duct, a severe penalty is a further factor tending to suggest
that Congress did not intend to eliminate a mens rea re-
quirement. In such a case, the usual presumption that a de-
86. See Gardner, supra note 2.
87. 21 u.s.c. § 841(c)(2).
88. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
89. Staples, 511 U.S. at 616.
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fendant must know the facts that make his conduct illegal
should apply.90
Although the majority's interpretation of section 841(c)(2) does
not dispense with the statute's mens rea altogether, it does dis-
pense of the general notion behind a mens rea, particularly that
an individual should be punished only for his intentional, rather
than accidental, acts of misconduct.9' In doing so, the majority
has taken the mens rea requirement of section 841(c)(2) out of the
traditional realm of "guilty mind" and inappropriately placed it in
the tort realm of negligence. As a result, defendants in majority
jurisdictions are required to have knowledge only of the tradition-
ally lawful conduct of selling pseudoephedrine; 92 thereafter, appli-
cation of the reasonable person standard may render the defen-
dants culpable under the statute, even though they may truly not
possess the requisite knowledge of the hypothetical reasonable
person as attributed by the court. With no other subjective
knowledge required, such defendants are then subjected to the
very same severe felony punishment 93 as those defendants who
were proven to have actual, subjective knowledge that the legal
drugs they sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.
Such an unjust outcome tends to suggest that Congress did not
intend to dispense with the subjective notion of the mens rea,
thereby alleviating the prosecutions burden of proof. Rather,
given this analysis, it appears likely that the Supreme Court, as
situated in Staples, would hold that the mens rea found in section
841(c)(2) requires the defendant to have actual knowledge, or
something very close to it, that the drugs he sold would be used to
manufacture an illegal substance such as methamphetamine.
D. Response to Criticism
The minority's subjective interpretation of section 84 1(c)(2)'s
mens rca requirement has been met by criticism from the majority
circuits, specifically in the cases of United States v. Kaur94 and
90. Id. at 618-19 (emphasis added).
91. See Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952).
92. The sale and distribution of pseudoephedrine should be categorized as "tradition-
ally lawful conduct." Until recently, there have been no such federal regulations controlling
the distribution of pseudoephedrine; rather, purchasers could freely purchase any quantity
of the legal drug from pharmacies and convenience stores. See Methamphetamine, supra
note 9.
93. Punishment may be up to twenty years imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c).
94. Kaur, 382 F.3d at 1157
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United States v. Galvan,95 respectively. The majority claims that
because knowledge is specifically mentioned within the statute as
an element of the statute's mens rea requirement, an interpreta-
tion that equates the "reasonable cause to believe" standard found
within section 841(c)(2) with one that is akin to "knowledge" would
render the statute superfluous and repetitive. 96 A closer inspec-
tion of the minority's approach, however, reveals that such an in-
terpretation does not render the statute either superfluous or re-
petitive.
The "knowing" standard of the statute's mens rea addresses di-
rect evidence that the prosecution may bring forth at trial to dem-
onstrate the defendant's actual knowledge that the pseudoephed-
rine sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Such
direct, actual knowledge can be proven through recorded state-
ments made by the defendant that demonstrate his actual knowl-
edge and guilt. Alternatively, the "reasonable cause to believe"
standard welcomes circumstantial evidence tending to prove ac-
tual knowledge of the accused. In the absence of any explicit
statement on behalf of the accused demonstrating his direct
knowledge and guilty mind, the "reasonable cause to believe"
standard ensures that the government can still prove actual
knowledge through substantial circumstantial evidence which
tends to prove something very close to the defendant's actual
knowledge. As such, the majority's criticism of the minority inter-
pretation is without merit, as each element of the mens rea re-
quirement found in section 841(c)(2) serves a distinct function in
the pursuit of justice.
E. Governmental Due Diligence
The arguments presented in this comment have not been made
with the intent to favor any particular defendant or group of de-
fendants. Nor are they motivated by any inherent sense of disdain
towards prosecutors or the government. Rather, the arguments
set forth are motivated simply by the pursuit of justice. Likewise,
the minority's subjective interpretation of the mens rea require-
ment found in section 841(c)(2) is not done with the intent to cre-
ate additional hurdles for the prosecution to jump through in or-
der to meet its burden of proof. It is, however, intended to ensure
that the government is doing all that it can and should do to meet
95. Galuan, 407 F.3d at 957.
96. Kaur, 382 F.3d at 1157.
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its constitutional burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, thus
ensuring justice within the criminal legal system.
The minority's requirement that prosecutors must prove a de-
fendant's actual knowledge, or something close to it, should not
act as an impediment to the prosecution's rate of conviction under
section 841(c) (2). Through various simple acts of governmental
due diligence, prosecutors should not be faced with any substan-
tial difficulties in proving the subjective, personal knowledge of
any given defendant. As outlined by the Tenth Circuit in Truong,
the government has at its disposal a number of methods by which
it can prove a defendant's subjective knowledge.97 For instance,
the government can help to satisfy its burden by issuing official
warnings or notifications to any pharmacy, convenience store or
individual which the government has reason to believe may be
violating section 841(c)(2). 98 These "Red Notices" act to inform its
recipients about the numerous state and federal laws relating to
pseudoephedrine distribution and its connection with metham-
phetamine production."9 Furthermore, these notices serve as
prima facie evidence that any recipient of such a warning has the
requisite knowledge regarding pseudoephedrine distribution,
methamphetamine production, the connection between the two
and the laws that are in place to suppress such illegal activity.
Recipients of these "Red Notices" will not be able to plead igno-
rance at the time of trial.
The government can also employ undercover agents to engage in
tape recorded conversations with a suspected felon regarding the
distribution of pseudoephedrine and its relationship to the manu-
facturing of methamphetamine. 100 The government has never
been bashful about employing the use of undercover agents in the
effort to stop crime. It is an extremely effective means of proving
the actual guilty mind of the accused, as the defendant's own in-
criminating words, which are typically caught on tape, can be used
at trial to prove actual knowledge and intent.
Additionally, the government can employ the use of police offi-
cers to follow suspected violators of section 841(c)(2) for extended
periods of time, in an effort to catch them engaging in actions that
tend to prove their actual knowledge of the connection between
97. 425 F.3d at 1289-90.
98. Id. at 1289.
99. Id. at 1290.
100. Id.
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pseudoephedrine and methamphetamine production. 10' This may
involve following a suspect to and from various locations as the
suspect sells or purchases large quantities of pseudoephedrine, or
simply staking out a given location that is suspected of regularly
distributing large quantities of the drug. Either way, such basic
governmental tactics can provide a substantial amount of circum-
stantial evidence from which a jury may reasonably determine
that the accused did indeed possess some degree of actual knowl-
edge that the pseudoephedrine he or she sold would be used to
manufacture methamphetamine in violation of section 841(c)(2).
The underlying point is the government can easily employ vari-
ous means and methods to obtain proof of a defendant's actual
knowledge of guilt pursuant to the minority's interpretation of the
mens rea requirement found in section 841(c)(2). Even in majority
jurisdictions that allow for proof of objective fault, the government
should be utilizing any and all of these tactics to ensure that inno-
cent individuals are not being subjected to the severe punishments
under section 841(c)(2). The pursuit of justice requires such gov-
ernmental due diligence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that the minority's interpretation of the mens
rea requirement found in section 841(c)(2) is currently applied
only by the Tenth Circuit, its requirement that prosecutors prove
the subjective knowledge of each defendant represents a powerful
tool for mitigating the risk of injustice associated with imposing
criminal liability on innocent parties. When cases involving viola-
tions of section 841(c)(2) arise within the remaining circuits that
have yet to address this issue, as they inevitably will, the circuit
courts should not be deterred by the fact that the minority's inter-
pretation is utilized in only one circuit.
As documented throughout, the minority's interpretation of the
statute's mens rea correctly reflects both the legislative intent be-
hind section 841(c)(2) and the historical purpose behind the impo-
sition of mens rea requirements throughout American criminal
jurisprudence. Furthermore, the minority approach is not suscep-
tible to the constitutional challenges that will likely plague the
majority interpretation in the years to come. As methampheta-
mine production continues to become more widespread throughout
101. Id.
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our society, every circuit court will undoubtedly be faced with is-
sues arising from violations of 21 U.S.C. section 841(c)(2) sooner
than later. For all the reasons set forth in this comment, circuit
courts that have yet to address this issue should follow the Tenth
Circuit's lead and adopt the subjective mens rea interpretation
found within section 841(c)(2).
Brian Walsh

